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Family Law.  In re Joziah B., 207 A.3d 451 (R.I. 2019).  Pursuant 
to Rhode Island General Laws section 15-7-9, parents are entitled 
to procedural due process before the termination of their parental 
rights, which means that a petitioner must present an affidavit 
which “set[s] forth the last contacts with the absent parent and any 
other information considered pertinent in determining the absent 
parent’s whereabouts”1 so that the Court can determine whether 
personal service can be effectuated. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On April 30, 2015, the Rhode Island Department of Children, 
Youth, and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate the 
parental rights of Heather B. (Heather) with respect to her son, 
Joziah B. (Joziah).2  DCYF’s complaint alleged that Joziah had been 
under its care for the past year,3 that it had offered services to help 
Heather correct the situation4 and, given Joziah’s need for a stable 
home life, there was a strong probability that Joziah would not be 
able to return to Heather’s care within a reasonable period of time.5  
In support of its complaint, DCYF filed a summary of facts stating 
that the department was initially contacted in 2013 by Joziah’s 
aunt, who reported that Heather had given Joziah to her with 
neither clothes nor money.6  Furthermore, DCYF alleged that 
Heather was homeless, had been using illegal drugs, had engaged 
1. In re Joziah B., 207 A.3d 451, 456 (R.I. 2019) (citing 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-7-9(a)).
2. Id. at 452–53.
3. Id. at 453.
4. Id.  These services, whether offered or received, led to Joziah’s
placement with DCYF.  Id. 
5. Id.  Two years later in 2017, DCYF amended its complaint to include
the allegation that Heather had abandoned Joziah.  “A lack of communication 
or contact with the child for at least a six (6) month period shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of abandonment or desertion.”  Id.  
6. Id.
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in acts of prostitution while Joziah was present, and her family was 
concerned that she “was sending her pimp to pick up [Joziah].”7  
DCYF further alleged that Heather had not cooperated with the 
department and failed to complete her treatment.8  It was also 
alleged that, while under Heather’s care, Joziah had been sexually 
abused, witnessed domestic violence, witnessed his mother 
performing acts of prostitution and, at one point, been kidnapped 
and held for ransom.9  By the time DCYF had filed its petition, 
Joziah was in his fourth foster home, had engaged in various 
incidents of “inappropriate sexualized behavior” with others, and 
had been diagnosed with PTSD and ADHD.10  The caseworker 
responsible for the summary of facts stated that she had not been 
in contact with Heather since March 2015 and that Heather had 
not been in contact with her son since February of the same year.11 
Following an investigation into the above-described incidents, 
the department placed Joziah in a foster home because of Heather’s 
neglect.12  In May 2015, Heather was assigned a public defender in 
conjunction with her arraignment in Family Court.13  Later that 
year, with a trial already scheduled on the matter, Heather agreed 
to the adoption of Joziah.14  Shortly thereafter, Heather filed an 
emergency motion to withdraw her consent, which was scheduled 
to be heard in January 2016.15  On September 22, 2017, via order 
of the Family Court, an advertisement was placed in The 
Providence Journal notifying Heather that a hearing on the petition 
to terminate her parental rights was taking place on October 3, 
7. Id.
8. Id.  DCYF alleged that Heather was “discharged from a family
visitation program [because] of her ‘ongoing use of heroin, cocaine, “other 
opiates,” alcohol and marijuana.’”  She was also diagnosed with various drug 
dependencies and disorders.  Id. 
9. Id.
10. Id. at 454.
11. Id. at 453.
12. Id.  The court was later updated; the caseworker’s last contact with
Heather was in November 2015, around the time she consented to Joziah’s 
adoption by his foster parent.  Id. 
13. Id. at 454.
14. Id.
15. Id.  Heather failed to appear at the hearing in January, but the motion 
passed.  Her public defender was, however, permitted to withdraw from the 
case.  Id. 
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2017.16  Even though Heather failed to appear, the Family Court 
proceeded with the hearing.17  Based on DCYF’s summary of facts 
and the uncontradicted testimony of Denise Zolnierz, the 
supervisor assigned to Joziah’s case, the Family Court justice made 
several factual findings.18 
The justice found, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
Heather left Joziah with his aunt for a period of three months, that 
DCYF had intervened in Joziah’s care, that DCYF had attempted 
to help Heather with the care of Joziah, that Heather failed to 
comply with the terms of DCYF’s plans, and that Heather had not 
been in contact with Joziah since November 2015.19  Furthermore, 
the justice found that Joziah had in fact been hospitalized for 
serious traumas, was now living in residential care and, although 
stable, was in need of further treatment.20  Based on these findings, 
the justice concluded that Heather was an unfit parent, terminated 
her parental rights and appointed DCYF as Joziah’s legal 
guardian.21  A decree was entered reflecting the justice’s findings, 
which Heather appealed shortly thereafter.22 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) sought 
to determine whether Heather was afforded proper procedural due 
process in the termination of her parental rights.23  Before the 
Court began its inquiry into the issue of procedural due process, it 
16. Id.  The advertisement stipulated that Heather’s failure to appear at
the hearing would result in the termination of her parental rights.  Id. 
17. Id.
18. Id.  Denise Zolnierz’s testimony included a relaying of the facts
mentioned in DCYF’s summary, along with additional facts such as Heather’s 
background in the correctional system, Joziah’s hospitalization, Joziah’s 
cancelled adoption, and updated information that Joziah was stable and living 
in a residential care center.  Id. 
19. Id. at 454–55.
20. Id. at 455.
21. Id. The justice weighed other factual findings in her decision, including 
that Heather abandoned Joziah and that, given his need for a stable home, it 
was unlikely that Joziah could be returned to Heather within a reasonable 
period of time.  Id. 
22. Id.
23. Id. at 456 n.7 (Referring to “proper procedural due process,” the Court
was tasked with determining the sufficiency of the notice given to Heather with 
regard to the hearing date scheduled on October 3, 2017). 
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recognized that in reviewing a decree terminating parental rights, 
it must apply a deferential standard.24  The Court explained that it 
“reviews termination of parental rights rulings by examining the 
record to establish whether the Family Court justice’s findings are 
supported by legal and competent evidence.”25  Furthermore, 
“[t]hese findings are entitled to great weight, and th[e] Court will 
not disturb them unless they are clearly wrong or the trial justice 
overlooked or misconceived material evidence.”26  In its review, the 
Court noted that although Joziah’s guardian ad litem27 argued 
Heather did not assert any issue with procedural due process, her 
statement “that she was not ‘aware of the court date on October 3, 
2017 or else [she] would have been there,’” indicated that Heather 
was in fact challenging the sufficiency of the notice given with 
regards to the hearing.28 
The Court noted that the statute governing the termination 
parental rights29 states that, when a petition has been filed where 
the parent-in-question’s location is unknown, “that fact shall be 
sworn to by the petitioners by affidavit which shall set forth the last 
contacts with the absent parent and any other information 
considered pertinent in determining the absent parent’s 
whereabouts.”30  Furthermore, the statute charges the Family 
Court with reviewing said affidavit to determine if personal service 
can be effectuated.31  Ultimately, the Court concluded that if 
effectuation of personal service is not possible, only then can notice 
be published in a newspaper of general circulation.32  After 
examining the record, the Court found that no such affidavit had 
been submitted by DCYF.33  Because DCYF failed submit an 
affidavit pursuant to section 15-7-9(a), the notice given in The 
Providence Journal by the Family Court on September 22, 2017 was 
24. Id. (citing In re Lauren B., 78 A.3d 752, 759 (R.I. 2013)).
25. Id. (citing In re Izabella G., 196 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 2018)).
26. Id. (citing Izabella G., 196 A.3d at 740–41).
27. Ad litem, Oxford American Large Print Dictionary, (2008) (Referring
to a guardian “appointed to act in a lawsuit on behalf of a child or other person 
who is not considered capable of representing themselves.”). 
28. Joziah B., 207 A.3d at 456 n.7.
29. Id. (citing 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-9).
30. Id. (citing § 15-7-9(a)).
31. Id. (citing § 15-7-9(b)).
32. Id. (citing § 15-7-9(b)).
33. Id.
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insufficient as a matter of law.34  Consequently, the Court held that 
Heather’s right to procedural due process was violated because of 
the insufficient notice of hearing provided by the Family Court.35 
COMMENTARY 
Ultimately, the present case affirms the importance of 
procedural due process in cases involving the termination of 
parental rights.36  While the Court recognized that there is “no 
absolute right to be physically present at [a] termination 
hearing,”37 it consistently stressed throughout its opinion that a 
parent’s right to the opportunity of presence should be protected.38  
On its face, the admission of an affidavit setting forth the parent’s 
last known contacts does not seem to invoke the opportunity of 
presence, however, the affidavit serves a larger purpose.  It affords 
the Family Court the chance to determine if personal service can be 
effectuated, thus protecting a parent’s right to the opportunity of 
presence at the termination hearing.39  Substantial weight is 
placed on procedural due process in cases terminating parental 
rights because of the significance of the right being terminated.40  
For “[t]he termination of a parent’s rights is a ‘grave, drastic, and 
irreversible action’” and therefore, the procedures which give rise 
to it must be protected.41  Yet, while there is heavy focus on 
parental rights, there is little focus on the rights of the child.42  
In cases such as this, it is critically important to keep in mind 
the well-being of the child, who deserves stability and efficiency.43  
Children, like others in the court system, have a right to efficiency 
and speedy determinations.44  The longer a child’s case continues, 
the longer he or she is in a state of limbo, not even sure who his or 
her legal guardian is.  While the protection of a parent’s right to due 
34. Id.
35. Id. at 456–57.
36. See id. at 457.
37. Id. at 456–57 (quoting In re Ariel N., 892 A.2d 80, 84 (R.I. 2006)).
38. Id. at 457 (citing In re Brandon A., 769 A.2d 586, 590 (R.I. 2001)).
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing In re Ginger G., 775 A.2d 255, 258 (R.I. 2001)).
41. Id. (quoting In re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655, 665 (R.I. 2012)).
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See id.
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process it extremely important,45 the end result in this case will 
likely be the same regardless of whether Heather received sufficient 
notice.  Proper notice does not negate the facts of the case and the 
unfortunate reality that Heather is an unfit parent.46  The Court’s 
focus on due process and its decision in the present case, while 
legally sound, will only further subject Joziah to years of continuing 
litigation.47  More time, money, and effort will be expended by the 
parties, only to reach the same conclusion.48  But this is the law.  It 
balances competing interests and comes up with the fairest 
solution.  Here, that is protecting Heather’s right to the opportunity 
of presence.49 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Rhode 
Island General Laws section 15-7-9, the notice provided by the 
Family Court in the instant case was insufficient as a matter of law 
given the lack of an affidavit submitted by DCYF.  As such, the 
Court vacated the decree of the Family Court and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.50 
Devon Q. Toro 
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id.
